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The Authors 

Vladimir Bukovsky is well known as a former political 
prisoner in the USSR for twelve years who was released in 
1976 in exchange for a Chilean communist leader. He is 
the author of eight books, the best known of which are 'To 
Build a Castle ' and the last one 'Judgement in Moscow '. 

Pavel Stroilov is a third year law student at the Modern 
University for Humanities, based in Moscow. He is also a 
researcher at the 'Memorial' research centre and has 
worked in various Russian archives for three years. 



The booklet 

Revealed in this publication are things always 
suspected by many in the West: the secretive discussions 
between Western and Soviet Union leaders planning to 
create a collectivist European Union State. 

The records of these discussions are so embarrassing 
to these various leaders that the archives have now been 
closed but not before the authors were able to gain access. 




EUSSR 



The Soviet roots of European integration 

"Our slogan is a world-wide Soviet Union." 
Anthem of the Comintern 1938 



By 

Vladimir Bukovsky and Pavel Stroilov 



£4.75 



ISBN 0-9540231-1-0 



Sovereignty Publications 
Worcester Park, Surrey, England 




EUSSR 



The Soviet roots of European integration 

"Our slogan is a world-wide Soviet Union." 
Anthem of the Comintern 1938 



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By 



Vladimir Rukovsky and Pavel Stroilov 



Sovereignty Publications 

Worcester Park, Surrey, England 







Contents 



Introduction 



Copyright © Vladimir Bukovsky and Pavel Stroilov 
All rights reserved 

Published December, 2004 

By Sovereignty Publications, 

28 Highdown, Worcester Park, Surrey, KT4 7HZ 

Printed by Donald Martin, 
Sudbury, Suffolk, CO 10 2TD 

ISBN 0-9540231-1-0 



Chapter 1 . Fateful decision 
Chapter 2. Crisis of Socialism 

Chapter 3. Socialist donkey 

- Spanish socialists 

- French socialists 

- British Labour 

- German Social Democrats 



17 
17 
19 
21 

22 



Chapter 4. Other forces from hell 



Chapters. Builders at work 



Chapter 6. Apres le deluge 



25 



33 



41 



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Introduction 

For anyone even remotely familiar with the Soviet system, its 
similarity with the developing structures of the European Union 
(EU), with its governing philosophy and "Democratic deficit", its 
endemic corruption and bureaucratic ineptitude is striking. For 
anyone who lived under the Soviet tyranny or its equivalents 
across the world - it is frightening. Once again we observe with 
growing horror the emergence of a Leviathan which we had hoped 
was dead and buried, a monster which destroyed scores of nations, 
impoverished millions and devastated several generations before 
finally collapsing. Is it inevitable? Is the human race bent on self- 
destruction and doomed to repeat the same mistake time and again 
until it dies in misery? Or, is the EU, indeed, simply a clone of the 
USSR imposed upon reluctant nations of Europe by the same 
political forces which created the first one? 

The answer to these questions can be found in the secret 
archives of the Politburo in Moscow which the authors were lucky 
to get access to. We refer those who want to see the originals to 
the archives of the Gorbachev Foundation (Inventories 1-1; 2-2; 2- 
3 and 3-1). 

Vladimir Bukovsky 
Pavel Stroilov 

December, 2004 



I 



1. Fateful decision. 

There are some days in history when the destiny of whole 
continents is pre-determined for many decades to come. One 
would not fmd these dates in an encyclopaedia, neither would 
students spend sleepless nights before exams memorising them. 
Only the few, the chosen, know and honour those dates. 

As for us, the unchosen masses, we go to sleep one night in a 
familiar environment of our ancient homeland, and the next 
morning we wake up in a desolation of some union of socialist 
republics. We are not supposed even to know who has taken that 
fatal decision and when. 

For Europe, one such date was 26 th March in the year 1987. 

That day, the Soviet Politburo made a decision on the USSR's 
future policy in Western Europe. Gorbachev formulated the gist of 
this policy briefly and clearly, like a battle order: 

To strangle in embrace. 

This concept already had a specific name among the inner 
circle of the Soviet leadership - "Common European Home". Soon 
it became known to the whole world. 

At that Politburo meeting "Common European Home" was 
given the highest priority. Gorbachev strictly prohibited the 
making of any political decisions without taking it into account. 

Many things, comrades, are involved here. Obviously, we 
should not make a decision on any issue without taking Europe 
into account. We need it even in our internal affairs, for 
perestroika. But in foreign policy Europe is irreplaceable. It means 



the strongest bourgeoisie in the world, not only economically, but 
politically as well. 

Look, it seemed that Japan had outraced the whole world, and 
suddenly West Germany made such a dash in the sphere of science 
and technology! 

Meanwhile, it was exactly in that sphere where Soviet 
backwardness had become catastrophic by that time. Indeed, 
Gorbachev decided to embrace Europe not because of sincere 
brotherly love. He had do choice. 

By the beginning of the 1980s, the Soviet leadership had 
finally woken up to the fact that their system had entered a period 
of profound structural crisis. On the one hand, their economic 
model, unproductive and wasteful by definition like all socialist 
models, had brought them to the brink of bankruptcy. On the 
other, their very 'success' in exporting that model to other 
countries was becoming an unbearable burden to carry on their 
shoulders. With their troops bogged down in Afghanistan, and 
with the Polish crisis looming large on their doorstep, the 'cost of 
Empire' had become virtually unsustainable. Simply put, they had 
suddenly realised that their economic base was too small for their 
global ambitions. Added to that a new round of the arms race 
forced on them by Ronald Reagan, falling oil prices and a growing 
discontent at home, and one could understand their sudden urge for 
reforms. A final blow came with Reagan's obsession with the 'Star 
Wars' project. The Americans might have been bluffing, but the 
Soviets had to follow suit regardless, trying to compete in the very 
sphere where they were most behind the West - high-tech. 

The only way to modernize the Soviet economy was to use the 
'class enemy's' technological potential. 

An important task is to use Western Europe's scientific and 






technological potential. All the more so since our Eastern 
European friends have already struck there. Our rapprochement 
with Western Europe would make their work easier. 

Gorbachev's idea was clear enough. On one hand, he feared 
the growing economic dependence of the Soviet satellites on the 
West. So, he hoped his friendship with Europe would secure the 
Western borders of his empire. On the other hand, once the other 
communist regimes in Europe were already fraternizing with the 
West, he felt it necessary to strengthen their embraces with the 
strangling grasp of the Soviet Union. Since these regimes were 
dealing with the class enemy anyway, they should do so in 
complete unity. 

Besides, the Politburo had to take care not only of the Eastern 
bloc, but also of the whole world. They came to the conclusion that 
'Common European Home' was a key to success of their 
worldwide plans. 

Europe is present everywhere: in Cambodia, in the Middle 
East, in Africa, and, of course, among our Eastern \b\oc\ friends, 
and even in Latin America. Without Europe, we are unable 
actually to move forward anywhere. 

If Western Sovietologists, by some miracle, knew about these 
"prospective measures of the USSR's foreign policy at the Western 
European direction", they would call it 'finlandisation'. Indeed, 
Gorbachev mentioned the Soviet experience of relations with 
Finland, and with Austria as well, as a good example of 
"constructing new international relations". Now he planned to 
expand them to continental scale. 

However, Finland and Austria were just small neutral 
countries, while NATO kept preventing finlandisation of the whole 
of Europe. Hence, the first particular objective followed: 



Not to split Western Europe from the USA, but rather to oust 
the USA from Europe. 

Later, Gorbachev often insisted that the "Common European 
Home" project never had been intended to cause a split between 
Europe and the USA. He lied. 

But, indeed, there is some difference between splitting and 
ousting. A split among enemies, good as it is, does not mean the 
parties become more hostile to each other than to you. The Soviet 
tactic of gradually ousting the USA by strengthening their own 
influence is different. This ousting, in turn, created additional 
opportunities to increase Soviet influence, whose goal was to oust 
the USA ever further. Thus it goes until final victory, when the 
Kremlin would be rewarded with an absolutely pro- Soviet, 
"finlandised" Europe and with the isolation of the United States on 
their own continent. 



Shall we succeed? I don't know. But we cannot shirk from 
setting this goal. Europe is our problem. Our interests are great 
there. And we should not fear. 

Gorbachev also emphasised two 'realities' to be seen, analysed 
and used. The first one was the 'diversity' of Europe. The Soviets 
had to work out the most suitable approaches to every country, to 
every political party, to various circles of various societies. 

The other 'reality' was European integration. It was necessary 
to analyse, Gorbachev said, which aspects of this integration were 
good for the Soviets and which were not. 



2. Crisis of Socialism. 



Before the mid-80s, Soviet leaders and most of the Western 
Left were hostile towards the European Communities and the 
Common Market, seeing them as a result of a conspiracy between 
multinational corporations and liberal politicians. 

It was the world-wide crisis of socialism in late 1970s - early 
1980s which made them start re-considering this attitude, as well 
as many other cornerstones of their strategies. 

The Italian Communist Party used to be seen by the Soviets as 
disloyal, if not hostile, because of its 'euro communist 1 direction. 
Now this had to be re-viewed, too. More than that, Italian 
communists played quite an important role in working out the new 
strategy. Its General Secretary of the time Alessandro Natta came 
to Moscow in January 1986. 

A. Natta. [...] Since the late 70s, not only the offensive of 
capitalism can be seen in the West, but also certain successes of 
this offensive in economic, political and ideological respects (the 
ideas of market and competition are getting ever stronger roots) . 

The response of the working class, of all the left-wing forces, 
to imperialism's attack is inadequate. To be frank, the position of 
the communist parties in the West is at a critical stage. It was not 
like this 15-20 years ago. There is a retreat, a loss of influence in 
the masses, and not only at the polls. The splits and deep crises in 
the parties have influenced the working class's position. And the 
reasons for this are not only in late reactions to imperialism's 
attacks, late evaluation of the new situation, but something else, 
too. 



And the communists are not alone in this distressful situation, 
the Italian continued. Rather, we are facing a common crisis of all 
the European Left. 

We live in Europe, in Western Europe, We were born there, 
and we are fighting for socialism in Western Europe. German 
social democrats, British Labourites, French communists have 
also met big problems, arising from scientific and technological 
progress, collapse of the 'welfare state' and unemployment. The 
social democrats have followed their traditional policy, but now 
they are beginning to ponder, too. However, the problems we 've 
met are not only European. They exist in other parts of the world, 
as well. 

The latest failure of the European Left had been, at that time, 
Mitterrand's attempt (in coalition with the Communists) to build 
socialism in France in 1981-1983. This experience became an 

object of the most intense attention in all discussions about the 
future of socialism. 

The French socialists say something we should take into 
account. An attempt at democratic reforms in a country like 
France is very difficult, unless it is accompanied by similar 
attempts in other countries. Just as the socialists began their 
reforms in France, the social democrats left the governments in 
West Germany and Great Britain. This caused a lot of trouble. 
Any progressive reform needs support from other progressive 
forces in Europe. 

Indeed, by trying to build socialism just in one, 'separately 
taken', country one would face a very unpleasant choice. If you 
keep building socialism you lose competitiveness. If you take care 
of competitiveness, you have no socialism. You cannot combine 
these two things, even armed cordons along the borders and other 
kinds of iron curtains do not help. The only solution is to impose 



8 



! 



socialism on your competitors as well. 

Progressive solutions in the social sphere must fit in the 
European framework. In one country, even the most interesting 
solutions would give only partial results. 

The new attitude of the Left to European integration was pre- 
determined by this very consideration. This attitude used to be 
cold, if not worse, for many decades, but now they realised that 
integration was about the only way to salvation. Many years of 
their struggle for power in independent European countries had 
proved fruitless. The only thing left to do was to try to seize 
control over the whole of Europe at once. 

We have to recognise, that the creation of a Single Market is 
not just a project, but a reality of Europe's development, Natta 
said. That is why the workers' movement of Western Europe, 
represented by its political parties and trade unions, should not 
ignore this process, but rather get involved in it actively. What 
does await us in the future? Decrease of unemployment or 
decrease of employment, alleviation or aggravation of economic 
problems, increase or decrease of influence of the major financial 
and industrial forces? Of course, we would be displeased if 
domination by tycoons like Agnelli would emerge in an united 
Europe. Let's hope that democracy will prevail, democracy in the 
sense of widening the social rights of the citizens, increasing their 
political rights, such as a right to truthful information. 

Certainly, speaking of democracy, communists always mean 
'social democracy', while 'truthful information' in their parlance 
has always been an euphemism for communist propaganda. That 
is what they hoped would prevail in an united Europe. 

However, it was not enough to hope, they had to act. Power 
over Europe would not come to the Communists by itself, they had 



to fight for it. 



who are in favour of social justice, of equality. 



"We assume that the European community is a really existing 
organisation, i. e. a kind of battlefield on which the leftist forces 
have to wage their political struggle", Nafta said. 

As for an united Western Europe, so far conservative and 
liberal forces still dominate. The leftist forces currently fall 
behind. Because, first, they failed to gain the support of a wider 
strata of the population. And, second, they failed to get closer to 
the centrist forces, representing the interests of new social strata, 
employed, for example, in the services sphere or in administration. 
These strata are unreservedly in favour of integration. 

Of course, this gap is not fatal yet, as we are willing and able 
to represent the interests of these new strata. But there is a real 
possibility that they will remain under the influence of the centrist 
or, at best, social democratic forces. The new social strata exists 
and develops independently from our reckonings and forecasts, 
and we have to work with them. 

Therefore, one thing was clear enough. It was necessary to 
unite all the left: communists, social democrats and anyone else 
who would support the socialist agenda. 

We need new efforts to widen the alliances, not only in Italy, 
but also in the European framework. And / mean all the leftist 
forces in a wide sense of this word. Not only communist, socialist 
and social democratic parties should be involved in these 
alliances, but also the whole complex of movements, of progressive 
forces with various aspirations, including the religious movements. 
In the peace struggle the religious forces outstrip the communists 
somewhere, in organisation if not in ideas. For example, in the 
Netherlands. In Italy the situation is variable as well: there are 
some bishops carrying out reactionary policies and there are some 



I 



10 



J 



However, in making these alliances we must preserve the 
communist identity of the party. The communist identity is a living 
process, not determined once and forever. I should like to repeat 
myself: the conditions have become complex, the processes are 
developing, and their laws are not established once and forever. I 
can see that you are thinking about this as well. Any transition 
from one phase of development to another always causes complex 
problems. They are not fatal problems, pre-determined once and 
forever. These are new opportunities. 

However, Gorbachev warned the Italian comrade they should 
not go too far. All their manoeuvres, smart as they might be, were 
to benefit the main goal: socialism. 

One thought, he said. In assessing your work, it is important 
always to keep in mind the attraction of the socialist ideal, of the 
socialist perspectives. No one except us would think about it. 
Others have other ideals, even the social democrats, let alone 
conservatives. You are right, we have no prepared position on the 
left front, while our task is to enrich the left movement, to get new 
allies. Perhaps, some intermediate stages will appear on the way. 
We should go through them, not losing sight of our goals. Some 
have got lost seeking answers to the questions raised. It is possible 
to lose all the positions as a result. [...] We should seek points of 
interface, temporary alliances are possible as well. But the true 
alternative to the bourgeois parties are the communists. 

Of course, this strategy meant inevitable and significant 
compromises, but that was acceptable. The Communist dogma 
allows that in an extreme situation. All the more so, as this retreat 
from Marxist orthodoxy was forced on the Left not only by 
political needs, but also, and even to a greater extent, by the 
economic crisis of socialism. This crisis urged them to moderate 



II 






their agenda anyway, introducing some elements of free market 
into the socialist model. But they found it to be a good idea to 
pretend this was a huge concession not to the reality, but to their 
political allies. 

We have already mentioned, Natta reminded, that the left-wing 
forces have, to some extent, lost their positions in the countries of 
Western Europe. One of the causes of this is a certain tardiness in 
the analysis and perception of the processes of great changes 
under way in contemporary capitalist society. And not only the 
communists are late with this, but also the socialists and social 
democrats. Absolutely insufficient was our analysis, our critical 
approach to the problems of contemporary capitalism, including 
the great changes which took place and continue in the sphere of 
production, in the social structure of the society. In particular, we 
took too defensive a stance on such issues as the 
internationalisation of the capitalist economy, development and the 
crisis of the 'welfare state ' and so on. 

We must recognise that, for example, the 'welfare state' 
brought great achievements to the working people - the spheres of 
services, pensions, social security. But at the same time we, the 
communists, having either overestimated or underestimated the 
functions of the 'welfare state', kept defending situations which, as 
has became clear only now, we should not have defended. As a 
result, a bureaucratic apparatus, which serves itself, has swelled. 
It is interesting that a certain similarity with .your situation, which 
you call stagnation, can be seen here. 

M. S. Gorbachev. 'Parkinson's law ' works everywhere ... 

A. Natta. Any bureaucratisatlon encourages the apparatus to 
protect its own interests and to forget about the citizens' interests. 
I suppose, that is exactly why the Right's demands of re- 
privatisation are falling on fertile ground in Western public 



12 






i 



opinion. 

Indeed, the decades of 'welfare state' devastated the European 
economy no less than a military invasion would do. But its 
architects were not honest enough to recognise they had made 
basic mistakes in their calculations. They preferred to move to 
opposition, gloomily leaving the others to clean out the debris of 
this beautiful construction and lament the ensuing "infringements 
on the working people's interests". Nevertheless, the picture was 
clear even to them. The experiment of the century had failed. Now 
they had to retreat, reshuffle the forces and try again. As 
Gorbachev said, 

let the conservatives take responsibility for the re-organisation 
of the economy. The communists ought to bring forward more 
topical slogans. 

Indeed, it is more important to keep power for a longer time 
than to take it quickly. So, the Left decided to step back, uniting 
and amassing their forces. They did not have to wait for too long. 

In 1992 the creation of the European Single Market is 
planned, Natta remembered. This will mean the erosion of all 
national frontiers: geographic, fiscal, economic. This will lead to 
the creation of a single European currency and ah European 
Central Bank. This process will be complex and will inevitably 
cause collisions of different opinions. The Left has a chance for 
success. 

The same reasons which made Western communists re- 
consider their policy this way, led their Eastern comrades to the 
conclusion about the need for 'perestroika'*. The difference was 
that the socialist experiment in the East had gone further, than in 
the West. This made the task of healing the economy much more 
difficult there. In addition, the Communists in the East had to do 



13 



this dirty work themselves, as there were no conservatives to pass 
the buck to. And, of course, the Soviet 'perestroika' was a failure, 
while the Western 'perestroika' was a success. The Western Left 
really managed to create this wide alliance, which is still governing 
Europe. 

However, there are amazing similarities and close 
interdependence in the origins, goals and means of both 
'perestroikas'. For that alliance of the European Left was 
originally supposed to be pro-Soviet. Therefore, it was important 
to make the pro-Soviet stance respectable first, and that was what 
Gorbachev's reforms were about. As Natta said: 

To maintain relations with the Left in Europe is not an easy 
task. [...] If the left-wing forces want to be more autonomous, 
they must have more connections to the Soviet Union, they must 
carry out policy for development and socialism. That is why our 
interest in the new stage of your development, which you are 
talking about, is so great. 

However, to Gorbachev this praise was not something 
unexpected, for his 'perestroika' policy was, first of all, addressed 
to the Western Left. Judging from these archive documents, it was 
international problems rather than internal ones which made the 
Soviet leaders start reforms. Not a big surprise, bearing in mind 
that the purpose of the Soviet Union's existence was world 
revolution. The Soviet people lived in an eternal struggle. Never 
did the Soviet power simply take measures - it always delivered 
strikes. Even the most peaceful points of the Soviet agenda would 
always be formulated as a 'declaration of war' ('fighting 
alcoholism', 'battle for harvest', 'war with bureaucracy' etc.). 

/* 

Therefore, to understand any of the Bolsheviks' activities, we 
should, first of all, find out against whom they were directed. 



14 






First of all, the new image of socialism undermines the 
traditional claims of the right-wing circles in the West for 
dominating influence, which used to be supported by the image of 
the enemy - socialist 'totalitarian monster'. Openly hostile to 
socialism the conservative front, which had strengthened in the 
West in the early '80s, began to erode, - 

said Gorbachev in his secret speech to his Warsaw pact allies 
on 6 th July, 1988. It was in that very speech, where he told them 
the details of the 'Common European Home' project. 

Judging from this speech, 'perestroika' was intended to change 
the political situation in Western countries rather than in the 
USSR. It was 

... to allow socialism to get involved in shaping world politics 
more actively and more widely, to influence it more effectively and 
to stimulate positive changes in the surrounding world. 

In other words, it was to influence foreign politics by any 
means, bringing the most "progressive" forces there to power. 

Being realists, [we] cannot wait for new partners, for a more 
democratic alternative to get into governments in the West. But, in 
substance, we are enabling such an alternative. 

The renewal of socialism is also an invitation to evolution of 
the capitalist world, an encouragement for the forces able to 
overcome class prejudice and ready for co-operative work in the 
solution of contemporary burning problems to take centre-stage 
there. And this can already be seen in the growth of influence of 
the bourgeoisie's moderate wing. 

In communist ideology, by 'bourgeoisie's moderate wing' they 
usually meant socialists and social democrats. The Soviet 



15 



'pcrestroika' created a favourable political climate for them, 
cutting the ground from under the Right. This policy combined 
perfectly with the Western Communists' efforts to unite all the Left 
in a wide pro-Soviet alliance. That is why Gorbachev, after 
listening to Natta's plan, blessed him: 

With great interest did we survey your views of the integration 
processes, your thoughts and ideas about the alternative to the 
existing state of affairs in Western Europe. [...] 

What should be the face of the future socialist alternative? 
Here we need a lot of analysis and theoretical work. It is clear, 
however, that we should not be afraid of alliances in the 
framework of the integration processes. You have already outlined 
the circle of your search for unity of the Left. I don 't think this will 
be easy. The Italian experience shows it is not. All the more so 
since it will be on an European scale. But I see that the Left is 
quite able to make the integration processes to contribute to 
democratisation of Western Europe, to solving the social problems. 

What is now going on in Western Europe will pre-determine 
the course of events for decades, if not for centuries. The Italian 
Communist Party has recognised the importance of a new 
approach to this process, in which many forces are involved. But 
it is hardly possible to protect the interests of the working people 
without the left-wingforces. Therefore we salute [. . .] your efforts. 



* Perestroika (re-structuring) is a widely used name for the reforms 
introduced by Gorbachev in the Soviet Union (1985 - 1991). 



16 









3. Socialist donkey. 

Needless to say, European socialists have enthusiastically 
welcomed the new partnership. This was their dream coming true. 
Ever since the social democrats split at the beginning of 20th 
century into Bolsheviks (communists) and Mensheviks (socialists), 
the latter were hoping that one day the Bolsheviks will see the 
light, "mellow down" and return to the fold of Social Democracy. 
And the former always shamelessly exploited this dream by 
pretending to see the Menshevik's 'light' each time they found 
themselves in a tough corner. Hence followed all sorts of Popular 
Fronts, United Fronts, etc. which all invariably ended in yet 
another quarrel (as soon as the Bolsheviks were comfortably out of 
a current trouble). Still, no matter how many times this scenario 
has repeated itself, the Menshevik's donkey was always happy to 
be once again seduced by the Bolshevik's carrot. What else could 
they do? After all, the difference between them was mostly in 
questions of tactics, their ultimate goal and, to some extent, their 
ideology was and is the same. 

So it happened again, with the launching of Gorbachev's 
perestroika which was perceived by European socialists as a great 
historic opportunity. 

Spanish socialists: 

...The success of perestroika means only one thing - the 
success of the socialist revolution in contemporary conditions. 
And that is exactly what the reactionaries don't accept, - said 
Francisco Fernandez Ordonez, Spanish Foreign Minister, to 
Gorbachev in Moscow, on 3 rd March, 1989. The Soviet leader 
appreciated such a deep understanding of his idea, so he replied: 

Now, addressing you as a socialist, I ask you to tell F. 



17 



Gonzalez that all of us should bear in mind one principal point. 
Today we, the communists, are working to realise the potentials of 
socialism as fully as possible, through perestroika. This is our 
model of socialist society. But I am sure that the success of our 
search would enrich the socialist values, which are common for all 
of us. Alt of us would be able to move forward significantly faster. 
I suppose, the Socialist International should be interested in that 
no less than ourselves. Eventually, we will manage to sort out 
which model of society is best to meet the yearnings of working 
people, their hopes for justice. This is something you and we 
surely can sort out. 

F. Fernandez Ordonez- What you are talking about is 
exceptionally important. In the process of perestroika the main bet 
is the outcome of the ideological battle. The success of the ideas of 
socialism in the contemporary world community depends on the 
success of perestroika. 

M. S. Gorbachev. Through our perestroika, through the new 
ideas brought forward by the socialists of Western Europe, we are 
not moving away from each other, we are doing the opposite. 
From our point of view, now, at the critical stage of the 
development of human history, there are no reasons why the two 
factions of the workers' movement should be positioned on 
different sides of the barricades once again. No, mutual 
understanding and solidarity, adequate to present realities, should 
dominate the relations between the two factions of the workers' 
movement. We are feeling real comradely interest, sympathy and 
understanding of our problems and difficulties, understanding of 
the importance of our course by those countries, where socialist or 
social democratic governments are in power. 

A year and a half later, on 26 th October, 1990, Felipe Gonzalez 
himself would tell Gorbachev in Madrid his complex theory of 
modern socialism. 



lb 






The Revolution of 1917, he said, began the split of the world 
into two antagonistic systems. The emergence of these two 
alternative models actually opened a way to attempts of creating a 
third model - social democracy. Nazism, fascism. Today the 
essence of the revolution, going on in the world, is the movement to 
the united world community. 

I must say that confusing ideological and political analyses as 
we did for many years - and, to some extent, all of us are 
responsible for that - made a fetish of the opposition between 
capitalism and socialism. For many years, to a great extent 
artificially, we supported that antagonism. 

Today I come to one quite strange conclusion. Since we came 
to power, I had to struggle with my party comrades to make them 
understand that the market economy is the best instrument to 
achieve our main goals. Just the best instrument, but not the goal 
in itself. I feel intellectual disgust when I have to read, for 
example, passages in the documents of 'G7' where the problems of 
democracy, freedom of human personality and ideology of market 
economy are set on the same level. As a socialist, I cannot accept 
such an equation. 

French socialists: 

The construction of a 'Common European Home' is a great 
idea. Anyone who has imagination and intellectual courage, 
would easily imagine the European continent, all of the countries 
situated there, as a new entity, connected by relations of a new 
kind, in the framework of which everyone remains oneself and all 
of them co-operate in the name of coinciding goals. I, personally, 
consider the realisation of this idea as my top priority. 

Thus spoke French President Mitterrand to Gorbachev on 26 th 
November, 1988, in Moscow. We can only wonder how he could 



19 



guess that a 'Common European Home' was something pretty 
close to his own pan-European ideas. 

Europe, united in the EEC framework is just the first step to 
the true goal, to achieve which we will need very much time - 
twenty five, fifty years or, perhaps, even the whole century. The 
true goal is the whole of Europe. 

But some aspects of the bright future, concealed behind the 
monumental facade of the 'Common European Home', were 
omitted in their public pronouncements. For instance, the common 
European structures were supposed to be based not only on the 
European Communities, but also on the economic organisation of 
the Warsaw Pact — the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. 
That is why one of Mitterrand's top priorities was the development 
of connections between the EC and CMEA. 



Since the Soviet Union was the strongest member of the 
CMEA, it was supposed to become at least one of the landlords of 
the 'Common European Home'. Naturally, this would mean either 
socialist 'home', or no 'home' at all. 

But Mitterrand was not afraid of that either. He was a 
socialist, and nothing socialist was alien to him. For the Soviet 
Union was promising to attach something like a 'human face' to its 
socialism. If so, why should not the West add a bit of socialism to 
its 'human face'? 

It seems to me, Mitterrand discoursed, that as far as individual 
rights are concerned, the practice existing in Western countries 
seems more perfect than the respective practice in the Soviet 
Union, At the same time, as far as collective rights are concerned, 
especially in industrially developed countries, the West as a whole 
will probably have to work a lot in this direction. I mean right to 
work and so on. 



21) 



And other social rights, Gorbachev happily provided the term 
from the Soviet jargon. 

F. Mitterrand. In France, by the way, there are a lot of areas 
where the problem of social rights reflects the inequality between 
various strata of French society. 

So, Mitterrand clarified his intention to solve this 'problem of 
social rights' in France and in Europe as a whole. This probably 
meant the elimination of social inequality, of which the 'problem' 
was only a reflection. Meanwhile, the East would complete their 
'perestroika' and little difference would remain between the two 
socialist empires. They would be ready to converge. 

British Labour: 

On 23 rd August, 1988, Gorbachev's advisor Vadim Zagladin 
secretly reported to his boss about his meeting with Ken 
Livingstone MP. 

The economic difficulties of Western Europe stimulate, 
Livingstone said, the process of political delimitation between it 
and the USA. The process of political unification of Western 
Europe is going to accelerate. I understand, Livingstone 
continued, that it is important for the Soviet Union not to allow a 
politically united Western Europe to turn into an anti-Soviet bloc. 
But this is not necessary at all. Significant political forces in 
Western Europe are in favour of other alternatives: Europe's 
greater independence in political aspect, which might be either 
neutral or developing good-neighbour relations with the East. 

Livingstone's general conclusion (and he claimed that this is, 
in fact, the opinion of the Labour Party's basic core) is that 
nowadays there are very wide opportunities to develop mutually 



21 



beneficial economic and intensive political contacts between 
Western Europe and the Soviet Union. Only one thing is important 
- to use these opportunities effectively. In future these 
opportunities may change, increase or decrease, but now they are. 
perhaps, most beneficial in the whole post-war period. Both you 
and we should make the necessary conclusions from this fact, 
Livingstone concluded. 

German Social Democrats: 

Of course, the most enthusiastic supporters of the project were 
German social democrats who had established 'special relations' 
with Moscow decades before. Even at the high noon of the Cold 
War, they cultivated (behind the backs of their partners in various 
coalitions) confidential communications with the Kremlin, often 
through KGB channels, thus becoming de facto its collective agent 
of influence. Here, at last, their hour had come! Their Chairman 
1 1. -J. Vogel (together with such a veteran Kremlin collaborator as 
Egon Bahr) hurried to Moscow in May 1988. 

Perestroika is a help to us all, to the entire progressive 
movement in the West. [.,.] [It] removed many obstacles on the 
way to cooperation between the forces of the Left, of democratic 
forces, and at the same time created new prerequisites for their 
further collaboration. 

Speaking of his party's prospects, he said that a 'decisive 
moment' is coming soon, with the creation in 1992 of the 'single 
market ', bearing in mind a necessity for Europe to strengthen its 
independence with regards to the USA, Zagladin reported. 

However, the main tool for implementing this project was the 
Socialist International (SI). Its Chairman Willi Brandt was one of 
the first Western politicians to visit Gorbachev after the latter was 
elected General Secretary, and different delegations of the SI were 



22 



constantly on the road to Moscow like Muslims to Mecca. Indeed, 
their relations were somewhat similar to those of Islamic 
worshippers and their Ayatollah. It came to a point when 
Gorbachev was simply instructing them what to do on this or that 
issue, and they would report on the implementation next time they 
came, seeking his approval like school kids from a teacher. 

/ would especially like to emphasize your last thought: it is 
extremely important to make perestroika a success. I would be 
most grateful to you if you tell us what do you expect from the so- 
called West, and from us - social democrats [....J - in terms of 
helping perestroika. There is a lot of talk now about the 'end of 
socialism ', that it has outlived itself. But I believe that from the 
viewpoint of history we are witnessing a new beginning, a new 
quality of socialism in a very large part of the world, said Brandt 
to Gorbachev in October 1989 when the SI delegation once again 
reported for duty. 

The scope of their joint activity was, indeed, huge and all- 
embracing, from publishing a theoretical magazine and 'trying to 
overcome the 1914 split' in the socialist movement to practical 
questions of politics. Some errands run by the SI for Gorbachev 
were of quite a sensitive nature. 

W. Brandt I am concerned with the situation in the Baltic 
republics. I am in touch with our Northern friends ... 

Exploiting his position in the SI, Brandt was using his 
Scandinavian colleagues as proxies in order to put restraining 
pressure on the democratic opposition in Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania. 

Our influence in that region is not huge. But I would like to 
assure you that we will use it only in the interests of pacification. If 
need be, we will tell certain people: questioning federation with 



23 





the USSR is like playing with fire. 


4. Other forces from hell. 




Indeed, luckily for us all, his influence was not omnipotent, 


However, all the talk of opposing US influence in Europe, all 




but he was quite happy to play the role of a prison guard and to 


the pretence at creating a European 'counterbalance' to the 




help his boss in keeping the captive nations from running away. 


remaining superpower sounded more like propaganda than a real 
goal of the EU. If nothing else, the United States did not oppose it 




How is your health, Mr. Gorbachev? Have you got enough 


at all, while certain influential forces in America have actively 




time to sleep? 


encouraged European integration. Thus, on 18 th January, 1989, a 
delegation of the Trilateral Commission visited Gorbachev - 






Rockefeller, Kissinger, Nakasone and Giscard d'Estaing. 
Ostensibly, their purpose was to encourage the Soviets to begin 
integrating into the world's economic and financial institutions 
(e.g. GATT, IMF), to convert the rouble etc. Then, suddenly, 
Giscard took the floor and said: 

V. Giscard d'Estaing. Nowadays Western Europe is 
experiencing a perestroika, changing its structures. It is difficult 
to say exactly when this will happen: five, ten or twenty years later. 
But a new modern federal state will emerge in Western Europe. 
That is where we are going, and the USSR should be prepared to 
communicate with a large single state of Western Europe. This 






future state will be open, ready for all forms of co-operation. 


• 




But then, perhaps, an issue of accession of some other states, 
dejure or de facto, will emerge. Most probably, this will include 
Austria, Switzerland, Scandinavian countries and, also, some East 
European states. We are not going to 'stir up' East European 
countries, to shake the basis of their stability. We see the dangers 
of destabilisation in different states and we are not interested in 
that. But we would like to know, if some East European countries, 






while preserving the ties of security with the USSR, wish to become 




associate members of the EEC, what would be your attitude to that 






idea? 




24 


25 



Kissinger did not object to this either. If nothing else, he was 
eager for the USA to become a part of the project: 

H. Kissinger. [...] Second line of considerations is related to 
the future of Europe, to inter-relations between its different parts. 
What do you think of a concept of 'Europe from the Atlantic to the 
Urals '? What will be the fate of that part of the Soviet Union 
which is situated to the East of Urals? What kind of relations will 
there be between the USA and the future Europe? 

My colleagues in the Trilateral Commission and I want to 
contribute in a constructive manner to the building of this Europe, 
in which both the USSR and the USA would have played a 
similarly positive role". 

Please note that this conversation was taking place in January 
1989, when even the Treaty of Maastricht was not drafted yet, let 
alone the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Treaty of Nice, or the 
European Constitution, not to mention the fact that no referenda on 
any of them had yet been held. How did they know, much before 
we have expressed any consent to these dramatic changes in our 
homelands, what will definitely happen in 20 years? Who are 
these people? Why do they have such enormous power over our 
lives that we all feel irrelevant, our wonted democracy 
notwithstanding? 

In any case, this quotation leaves us with a host of burning 
questions about the mysterious links between the European 
superstate project, Giscard d'Estaing and the Trilateral 
Commission. What is Giscard's role in the construction of the 
European superstate? And what is the connection between this and 
his recent authorship of the notorious European Constitution? 
Above all, what has the Trilateral Commission to do with all of 
that? 



26 



The mystery continued with Georges Berthoin, the European 
co-chairman of the Trilateral commission, who came to prepare 
Jacques Delors' visit to Moscow. Here is what Vadim Zagladin, 
Gorbachev's advisor on European affairs, reported about this secret 
conversation: 

On my meeting with the Co-Chairman of the Trilateral 
Commission Georges Berthoin. 

4'" April, 1990. 

The meeting with G. Berthoin took place at his request. During 
it, he expressed a number of ideas connected to the forthcoming 
visit to Moscow of J. Delors, Chairman of the Commission of the 
European Communities, and his intentions. 

I. G.Berthoin is an old friend of J, Delors. He began the 
conversation, characterising Delors as a dry, very businesslike 
person, but, deep in his soul, sincere and loyal to his beliefs. He is 
able to change his beliefs, but only under the influence of 
conclusive arguments. 

Then my companion noticed that Delors is coming to Moscow 
this time first of all as the Chairman of the Commission of the 
European Communities. Meanwhile, we should take into account 
that nowadays he is the only West European politician, who has 
certain authority and 'means something' for each of the twelve 
member-states of the Community. 

For example, as for his own country - France - he is one of 
the possible candidates to become its President. [...] 

For Germans, Berthoin continued, Delors is the only West 
European politician who enjoys practically unreserved trust. In 
Germany, he has relations with all the political circles, and all of 
them take him into account to this or that extent. 



27 



For Englishmen, Delors is the man who has persuaded the 
trade unions to support the idea of the Common Market. 
Naturally, Margaret Thatcher likes Delors little just for this 
reason. But she takes him into account, too. 

Delors is also respected in Spain, Portugal and Greece, 
because it was he who, during the negotiations on these countries' 
entrance into the Common Market, pressed for a longer 
transitional period for them and for more beneficial conditions of 
entry. 

In other words, concluded G. Berthoin, Delors is the man who 
is able to influence other countries' positions and many things in 
the future position of the European Communities depend on him. 

2. Nowadays, Berthoin said, Delors is most concerned with the 
following problems: the German question (he is for the unification 
of the two German states, but he intends to find a solution which 
would neither damage the European Communities, nor the 
European idea); the increase of political power of the European 
Communities, i.e., in fact, their transformation into a kind of 
federation; the problems of co-operation between the Communities 
and Eastern Europe. Naturally, he will probably wish to know the 
opinion of the Soviet leadership on all these issues. 

He is going to be particularly interested, my companion 
continued, in the following aspects of the above problems. 

Delors wants to understand our goals concerning Eastern 
Europe. To be more precise, he is interested what, in our view, 
our own relations with the countries of Eastern Europe should be 
and what the West's relations with these countries should be; what 
we consider to be important, from the point of view of the 
provision of our own security in a military and a political sense, 
and economic security of our country as well. 



In connection with this, Delors will probably be interested in 
what we think of [President Mitterrand's] idea of European 
confederation. Talking to Berthoin himself, as my companion told 
me, Delors meditated: is, for the Soviet Union, the idea of 
'European confederation' identical to the idea of 'Common 
European Home? Then he asked a question, whether the Soviet 
Union considers itself as a whole, from Brest to Vladivostok, 
belonging to Europe. Or the USSR counts on its Western part's 
only 'involvement in Europe'. In Delors's opinion, it is difficult to 
imagine that the whole Soviet Union, including, for example, its 
Asian republics, can become a member of the Common European 
Home. He would like to hear the Soviet argument about that. 

In fact, Berthoin went on, the further evolution of Delors's own 
concepts much depends on what these arguments will be. The idea 
of categorical separation of the whole Soviet Union from Europe is 
alien to him. He understands that the USSR is a single entity. 
However, at the same time, if the whole USSR will be a part of the 
Common European Home, what should we do about the USA ? 

During his talks with Berthoin, Delors used to ask him a 
question like that, as well: would it be clever to integrate Japan? 
Certainly, Japan is not Europe. But, in fact, Europe, USA and 
Japan is a single complex, to some extent. Is it possible that the 
European process can, after some time, become a factor, 
contributing to constructive co-operation of all the countries of the 
Northern hemisphere? 

G. Berthoin added, that in his persona! opinion, Delors lacks 
clarity in all these questions. All his ideas bear elements of 
realism. But, on the other hand, if we try to base today's policy on 
the idea of the whole northern hemisphere's co-operation, would it 
not lead to the destruction of the European idea as such? 

However, in Berthoin's opinion, short-term and long-term 



29 



strategies of the European Communities will, in many respects, 
depend on the results of negotiations between Delors and 
Gorbachev. 

3. Berthoin expressed interesting ideas , concerning Delors's 
views on the general problems of contemporary international 
relations. In the opinion of the Commission of the European 
Communities' Chairman, there is currently a kind of struggle being 
carried on in the world between two kinds of diplomacy. One of 
them is the traditional diplomacy of defending the national 
interests of every country, separately. The other kind is diplomacy 
based on the growing interdependence of nations, which 
(interdependence) means the necessity of integration both in the 
economy and in politics. 

Probably now, (reasons Delors, according to Berthoin), we 
can see a kind of compromise between these two approaches. This 
compromise has a strong influence upon the positions of separate 
countries and the EEC as a whole about the choice of the way 
forward, working out the so-called architecture of the future 
European and world order. 

In Delors's opinion (though, in principle, he supports F. 
Mitterrand's policies and, in turn, enjoys his support), the French 
president has not made a conclusive choice yet between the old 
and the new kinds of diplomacy. That is why he is so inconsistent 
on many issues, including the one of France's role in the world and 
in Europe, and the German question. 

Delors himself believes, that today's compromise approach 
(which, in his opinion, can be seen everywhere) cannot exist for a 
long time. Either Europe and the world return to the old 
approach, which would be very dangerous, reviving the old 
international conflicts, or the new approach wins, oriented 
towards a wide integration, and then the world would really get a 



30 




Li 



new quality. 



I don't know, Berthoin said, whether Delors will ask this 
question directly to Gorbachev or not. Anyway, he will bear it in 
mind. 

[■•■] 

In the end Berthoin said, that he had decided to tell me so 
frankly about Delors's plans not only by the right of an old friend, 
but, first of all, because he wants Delors's visit to Moscow to be 
marked by really serious advances in solving the burning 
European and world problems. "This is what our common future 
depends on", he concluded. 

Admittedly, we know too little about this secretive Trilateral 
Commission to draw any far-reaching conclusions, but one thing 
we can claim for certain: it was unlikely to encourage an anti- 
American project. Somehow, their ultimate goals must have 
coincided with those of the European integrationists. Could it be 
an idea of World Government somewhere in the misty future, for 
which the EU was perceived by them as a step in the right 
direction? Such interpretation, often rejected and ridiculed as a 
'conspiracy theory', has nonetheless some documentary evidence 
to support it. Speaking with Argentinean President Carlos Menem 
on 25 th October, 1990, Gorbachev mused: 

M.Gorbachev. [...] But we should go further. Further 
progress will depend on the actions in Europe, in Latin America, 
in the Asian-Pacific region. After the European home is built, 
many other homes of cooperation must follow. [..J 

C. Menem. [...] speaking of integration, everyone agrees with 
it. We in Latin America intend to act along the same lines as 
Europe. In general, humanity has no other choice. And then, after 



31 






integration, we will concentrate on conquering the universe, 

M.Gorbachev. One of my aides has written sometime ago that 
we need to create a world government. People were laughing at 
him at that time. But now? 

C.Menem. Some 40 years ago Per on was speaking of 
continentalism which would enable us to go for a world 
government. 

M.Gorbachev. I believe we should think about enhancing the 
UN role. It could not realise its potential for 40 years and only 
now did it get such an opportunity. Here is a proto-type of the 
world government for you. 

However, traditional anti- American orientation of many forces 
in Europe was routinely exploited in order to get them aboard. 
Thus, reporting on his talks with the former French Ambassador to 
the USSR, Henry Froman-Meris, Zagladin notes that his collocator 
tried to dispel Soviet fears of European military integration as a 
potential for a new arms race by playing the anti-American card: 

My companion assured me that nobody in the West is thinking 
about a military build-up, rather the opposite. And then, lowering 
his voice to half-whisper for some reason, he said: "You see, it wilt 
not be an American union, it will be an European one, and not in 
the NATO framework". To my objection that most of the EEC 
members take part in NATO military organisation, my companion 
winced and replied: "anyway, Europe wants to have its own 
defence policy, and we are going to discuss the issues, connected 
to it, with you". 

And offered in conclusion his advice: 

that we 'don 't over-sell ' the idea of a Common European 
Home, don 't 'scare the Europeans away '. 



32 



5. Builders at work. 

So, the pro-Soviet alliance grew even wider than its initiators 
had ever hoped. Not only the Left, virtually the whole world 
idolised Gorbachev. Any of his ideas, including the 'Common 
European Home' were enthusiastically accepted, though most of 
his followers hardly understood his goals. 

Thus, Jacques Chirac, then Mayor of Paris, was terribly 
puzzled by the idea of a 'Common European Home' (which did 
not prevent him from fully supporting the project). Being 
somewhat naive, he made a wrong conclusion after listening to 
Gorbachev for a while that the 'Common European Home' would 
consist of two different parts: socialist East and capitalist West. 

If we understand you correctly, the Common European Home 
you have mentioned will consist of two separate constructions 
under one roof. As far as we are concerned, we would like to 
create a more uniform building, with greater intertwining of its 
parts, based on peace reinforced by the disarmament policy, on 
growing exchanges, on ever more uniform understanding of human 
rights, he told Gorbachev in 1989. 

M. S. Gorbachev. I think you understand our approach 
imprecisely. Perhaps, you don't have full information on what we 
actually mean. 

Judge for yourself, what may happen if you tell us: transform 
to what we wish you to be, while we shall wait and see. We, in 
turn, would address the same request to you. Naturally, nothing 
good would come out of that. We need different approaches. 

There are certain realities: we have two systems, two military 
and political blocs, two sets of values innate to each of us. Now, 



33 



let's try to move the whole process forward on the basis of these 
realities. And, along with political contacts, let us set connections 
between military and political blocs, economic communities, 
cultural centres, capital cities etc. All of this, as we believe, would 
create a new situation, when the trappings of the Cold War and its 
alienation would be eliminated step by step. 

In a word, there is a positive potential. It is like one family. 
There might be differences between its members, which does not 
prevent them from normal coexistence, from bearing responsibility 
for themselves and for the family. We should proceed from the 
existing realities rather than from ideological postulates and 
sympathies. As a result of communication, the exchange of ideas, 
the whole situation may become different. New opportunities may 
emerge, which we don't even suspect now, but with which we will 
have to deal in the future. 

Probably, the most difficult question after we build the 
Common European Home would be that of where the main capital 
city should be situated... 

At this point Gorbachev realised he had already told too much. 
So, he chuckled and said: 

...But, probably, all the capitals should remain as they are. 

And Chirac, happy as a lark, went away to work on that 
construction site. There he spent the next fifteen years, even after 
the chief architect of the project had to change his profession to 
that of a pizza seller. 

Socialists were more in tune with the fundamentals and less 
naive, 

We believe the builders' team for this home must be European- 



34 



wide, Gorbachev was telling the visiting leader of the German 
social democrats H.-J. Vogel. There are certain realities here, 
such as NATO and the Warsaw pact. 

H.-J. Vogel. Every house must have load bearing walls. Those 
organizations fit the requirement. [...] 

The other two 'walls' of the building, as both of them happily 
agreed, were supposed to be the CMEA and the EEC. 

It is important to make sure that integrational processes in 
both parts of Europe did not diverge. 

[...] / would also like to know your attitude to the current 
stage of the development towards a new order in Europe, bearing 
in mind the interests of stability and peace. This corresponds to 
your ideas of a Common European Home. For we have already 
built the first floor of that home - West European integration, 
asked French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas when visiting 
Moscow in November 1989, eager to be assured that the blueprints 
are still the same. 

Gorbachev. This is only an annexe to it. 

R. Dumas. Yes, we can call it an annexe. But, building the 
next floors, we should have a common architectural design and try 
to have our floors compatible. 

Dumas had every reason to be worried because the Eastern 
half of their common home was suddenly showing cracks all over 
its edifice, its rafters were threatening to fall down on the heads of 
the ill-fated builders. The Berlin Wall had just crumbled down to 
earth, exposing the weakness of the whole construction. 
Gorbachev urgently needed a prop-up from the Western side. 



35 




It is agreed, that the changes are gathering speed in the 
countries of Eastern Europe. Bui is the West changing? - he 
demanded. 

R. Dumas. This is a good question [...] 

M. S. Gorbachev. By the way, my conversation with you is 
lightened by the fact that we represent two tendencies of the 
socialist, workers' movement. Did you not forget about that? 

R. Dumas. If you see signs of surprise in my eyes, this is only 
because I was just going to say the same thing. 

But, worries aside, they continued to dream on regardless. On 
19 th July, 1990, Delors, properly introduced by Berthoin to 
Zagladin, came to Moscow. And here is what he told Gorbachev 
about his architectural views: 

I see three floors in the architecture of Europe. The first floor 
is Europe of 'the twelve '. And to those who are afraid of a united 
Germany and the dominance of the German Mark, I say: as 
Germany is among 'the twelve', it will be the ECU, not the 
German Mark, which dominates. The second floor is Europe as a 
whole, including the Soviet Union. Here, undoubtedly, the 
problems of disarmament and measures of trust are important, but 
we also should think about the coming CSCE [Conference on 
Security and Co-operation in Europe] meeting on measures in the 
areas of ecology, transport and energy. When the time comes and 
European countries' economies get close enough to each other, we 
can turn to what Mitterrand is talking about, to European 
confederation. And the third floor is the CSCE, including the USA 
and Canada. We involve them in the collective resolution of great 
problems. But Europe is growing, expanding and getting ever 
greater autonomy. 

At this stage any more sober-minded bricklayer than our 



36 



dream-builders from cloud cuckoo land would have been running 
for cover, as the collapse was much in progress. Czechoslovakia 
had just opted out of a socialist future, Poland had already elected 
its first post-communist government, the Baltic states were pushing 
for complete independence and in the German elections the social 
democrats were utterly defeated. The future was bleak for 
Gorbachev and his Western partners could offer him little help in 
practical terms. 

On 3 rd April [\99ty I met Jacques Atiali, special advisor of the 
French president [...] reported Zagladin. 

Finally, J. Attali told me that currently a plan to establish a 
new body is being thought over in the European Communities. A 
Senate of Europe is expected to be created soon, alongside the 
European Parliament. In the Senate separate regions, rather than 
countries, will be represented. For example, senators from France 
will be representatives of Alsace and Lorraine, Brittany, 
Normandy etc. From Spain there will be representatives of 
Catalonia, Country of Basques, Andalusia etc. Thus, not only 
ambitions of countries, but also those of separate regions will be 
satisfied. 

Perhaps, J. Attali asked rhetorically, if in future the USSR is 
represented in the European Parliament, its separate regions, such 
as Lithuania, may be represented in the Senate of Europe? I asked 
whether Attali admitted the USSR might enter the European 
Community, which is necessary to be represented in the European 
Parliament. Attali replied: "this is, of course, the question of the 
future and of the further development of the USSR. But, 
personally, as a theorist of politics rather than a practitioner, I 
accept this is possible". 

Alas, it was too little too late. The Soviet empire had, in 
essence, already collapsed, and there were no forces in the world 



37 



able to save, or rather resurrect it. But the socialists kept trying 
until the very end. The donkey was simply unable to face the fact 
that the carrot it had followed for almost a century was lost 
forever. And at what a moment! At the very eve of an historic 
victory, when the Left had finally managed to hijack the European 
project, and were already preparing to "build the new international 
order on worldwide scale". They were beginning to believe in 
their invincibility. 

So, they kept trying. 

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union International 
Department wrote in a secret report, dated June 7" 1 , 1991. 

[...] the process of reforms in the countries of Eastern and 
Central Europe is marked by the dismantling of socialism, by 
elements of 'wild capitalism ' being developed and by the level of 
the working people's social security falling down. This causes 
concern among the leading European parties - members of the 
Socialist International. They are conducting a search for means to 
oppose these unwanted trends in social development. [...] 

Apparently, French socialists were the most vociferous. 
According to the report, they were worried by the problem of the 
survival of the socialist idea in the conditions of its crisis in 
Eastern Europe. 

However, most of the 'means' the socialists suggested were 
various forms of chat: meetings, conferences and informal talks on 
such burning issues as: "problems of relations between socialists 
and communists", "new concept of the socialist and social 
democratic parties' actions in the conditions of a changing 
Europe" or "The European Community and Eastern Europe after 
the unification of Germany: challenge to the Left". 



>X 



The communists tried to make even these impotent activities 
helpful by drawing the attention of international political circles 
and the public to the unconstructive position of Hungary, Poland 
and Czechoslovakia (whom, perhaps, Bulgaria will join soon) on 
the problem of these countries' new treaties with the Soviet Union. 

The Warsaw Pact was dead, and the Soviets were desperately 
trying to substitute it with a series of hilateral treaties while the 
former 'brothers' were striving to wriggle out of them by hook and 
by crook. Who else could help at this dark hour but the old loyal 
Menshevik donkey! And he did oblige by putting pressure on the 
emerging East European democracies not to escape from the 
Soviet concentration camp. 

At the last moment, just a few months before the Soviet 
collapse, no lesser figure than Pierre Mauroy (former French 
Prime-Minister and Vice Chairman of the SI) offered to come to 
Moscow and to work out a salvation strategy. And he did, too! On 
September 17 th , 1991, a SI delegation headed by him was speaking 
with Gorbachev. 

P. Mauroy. A really tough question - about the future of 
socialism in your country. [...] You said yourself that the old 
communist model has disappeared. Of course, socialism in your 
country will be of a Soviet type, the one which suits your country. 
However, I am convinced that your democratic society will fit into 
the framework of the socialist movement developing in Europe, 
and in the rest of the world. [...] The fact that we are here, 
standing beside you after the two movements of the workers were 
separated for 73 years makes me all emotional. We hope that 
socialism, freedom, democracy will be a common destiny of your 
country and ours, within the framework of diversity we see today. 

Our donkey had finally got his carrot. 



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Within three months the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
was no more. Half of the European building was lying in ruins. 



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6. Ap res le deluge. 

One would expect our builders of the brave new world to 
become disheartened by such a catastrophe. At the very least, they 
should have re-assessed their project, investigated the causes of 
this disaster, made some corrections in the design. Or, perhaps, 
even abandon it altogether: after all, a need to overcome the great 
European divide thus saving the world from the nuclear holocaust 
was always cited by them as a main justification of the project. 
And here we were, looking at the ruins of the Soviet empire which 
was the only threat to peace in Europe for half a century. No need 
for any effort or strategy, any complex construction or 
sophisticated diplomacy. The divide closed on its own. We could 
have lived happily ever after. 

At least there was definitely no need to continue building 
structures so similar to the Soviet ones. Yet, this is what our 
builders did, as if nothing happened, From the Maastricht Treaty, 
to the Amsterdam Treaty, to the Treaty of Nice and finally to the 
draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, the 'democratic 
deficit' grew, the layers of bureaucracy multiplied, the lies and 
coercion became endemic and we, the people of this ancient 
continent, became more and more irrelevant. Gone is the initial 
pretence that our nations' sovereignty is not at stake; today we are 
openly told about a single state of Europe as a goal of the project. 
Why did not they say it before, if they knew it 20 years ago? Was 
it in order 'not to scare Europeans away'? 

Still, the ultimate truth about it is not revealed yet and is 
unlikely to be ever admitted by them, namely, that the whole 
project is nothing but a clever attempt by a bankrupt socialist 
nomenklatura to salvage their bankrupt Utopian dream and their 
unearned position of power. 



41 



When they ask us to vote for their numerous treaties, why 
don't they simply say: Vote for Socialism! 

When they force impoverished nations of Eastern Europe to 
join their shining city on the hill by false promises of prosperity, 
why don't they say in plain language: Here is a chance for you to 
live under socialism again! 

When they offer us this monstrous grossbuch (big book) of a 
Constitution, as unintelligible and as lengthy as Karl Marx's Das 
Kapital, why don't they just say: Here is a roadmap to the 
European Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics. Vote for it! 

But they don't because they know very well that no nation on 
earth will ever vote voluntarily for this bankrupt idea. Instead, 
they use every deception possible to conceal the true nature of the 
beast. 

For those of us, however, who have already lived in the belly 
of that beast, the truth is self-evident. We can even predict what 
will happen with a good degree of accuracy. In fact, this is not a 
terribly difficult trick to perform as long as you remember one 
basic rule: Utopians always deliver exactly the opposite to what 
they promise. 

They are telling us now that one of the reasons we need such 
an European superstate is to avoid war in Europe. At this 
particular point there is no threat of war here, not at least of any 
serious war, but at the end of their experiment the countries of 
Europe will be so much at odds with each other that they will be on 
the verge of conflict. 

We are told that it is necessary for us to suppress our ethnicity, 
our nationality, our prejudices, our traditions and then we would be 
living as multi-national communities happily ever after. We can 



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tell you in advance, the opposite is going to happen. After seventy 
three years of living in the Soviet Union which was supposed to be 
a happy family of nations we had so much ethnic conflicts that no 
other country could produce. Look at former Yugoslavia which 
also claimed to be one happy family of nations under socialism. 

We are told today that the aim of the EU is to become 
prosperous. Our economy will be capable of competing with the 
United States thus enabling Europe to stand up for its interests. 
The opposite will happen. Over-regulated, over-bureaucratic, the 
over-taxed economy of the European Union will become very 
weak, the nations of Europe will become poorer and poorer and 
more and more dependent on the United States. 

They are telling us that the peoples of the EU will enjoy 
unprecedented freedom and human rights. They are lying for they 
began by depriving us of the most basic right - a right to elect by 
direct ballot those who govern us. We do not elect those People's 
Commissars who govern the EU. And this is just the beginning. 
What about that sinister Europol, or Eurojust with its 'European 
arrest warrant', its diplomatic immunity and the power to prosecute 
the ill-defined 'crimes' of 'racism' and 'xenophobia'? One 
wonders how many former East German Stasi officers, or their 
colleagues from other East European countries will end up 
working there. Judging by the example of the latest Commission, 
which has seven former communist apparatchiks out of 25 
Commissioners, we might have up to one- third of them. If we 
learned anything from the lessons of the last century, it must be the 
notion that every Utopia ends up in a GULAG of its own. And it 
just remains to be seen what kind of a GULAG will the EU create. 

Meanwhile, the EU will continue to expand uncontrollably, 
unable to stop, until it collapses in exhaustion pretty much like the 
late Soviet Union. In his parting speech, Romano Prodi had 
already drawn us a map of that expansion by including in the 



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sphere of EU interests the whole of the Middle East, North Africa 
and Turkey. And if they achieve complete integration of the whole 
globe, they will begin conquering the universe, as we remember. 
No Utopian dreamer can ever stop dreaming of expansion because 
no Utopia has ever worked in a limited space, be it a village, a 
town, a continent or a planet. But, once it stops expanding, it 
invariably collapses. 

Yes, it will collapse very much like its prototype did. But in 
doing so it will bury us all under the rubble. And it might take a 
generation to clear up the mess. Do we really need to go through 

this? 



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